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Abstract 
This research studies the impact of changes to federal judicial discretion on criminal sentencing 
outcomes. The Feeney Amendment to the 2003 PROTECT Act restricted federal judges’ ability 
to impose sentences outside of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and required appellate courts to 
review downward departures. Using data on all federal sentences between 1999 and 2004, we 
examine the effect of the Feeney Amendment on the downward departures rate and prison 
sentence. We control for type of offense, district of sentencing, criminal history, and 
demographic characteristics of the offender, in order to isolate the changes in judicial sentencing 
due to the implementation of the Feeney Amendment. Our results suggest that the Feeney 
Amendment reduced the probability of a downward departure by 5% and increased prison 
sentences by two months. There is no evidence that judges adjust sentences in an effort to 
circumvent the intentions of the Feeney Amendment. 
 
JEL Codes:  K14, K40 
Keywords:  Federal Sentencing Guidelines, criminal justice 
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Introduction 
Over 74,000 people each year are tried and sentenced in federal court and over $17 billion are 
spent annually prosecuting and housing federal criminals (Hughes 2007). Since the mid-eighties, 
individuals convicted in the federal court system were sentenced under uniform sentencing 
guidelines laid out by the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC).  In recent years, the 
U.S. Congress has instituted major changes to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that district court 
justices must follow.  Specifically, the Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act (effective April 
30th, 2003) was passed to reduce the downward departures by judges from the standard guideline 
sentencing ranges.  This research studies the impact of the Feeney Amendment on sentencing 
outcomes of criminal cases.   
 
The Feeney Amendment restricted federal judges’ ability to impose sentences outside of the 
guidelines and required appellate courts to review downward departures. A controversial feature 
of the Feeney Amendment is the mandate for a reporting system; the district’s chief judge must 
submit a written explanation for any departure to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, who then 
passes the data along to the Justice Department or Congress when requested. Also as a result of 
the Feeney Amendment, Attorney General John Ashcroft ordered federal prosecutors to charge 
defendants with the most serious provable offense and actively oppose downward departures. At 
this time, prosecutors and judges no longer must abide by the Feeney Amendment provisions.  In 
January of 2005, the Supreme Court ruled that the amendment and the mandatory Sentencing 
Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment. The ruling, however, was written in such a manner 
that the U.S. Congress could recreate the amendment to be considered more constitutional.  
 
Using U.S. Sentencing Commission data on all federal sentences between 1999 and 2004, we 
examine the effect of the Feeney Amendment on the rate of downward departures and total 
prison sentence. We control for the type of offense, offense level, criminal history of the offender 
and offender demographic characteristics, in order to isolate the changes in judicial sentencing 
due solely to the implementation of the Feeney Amendment. For policymakers considering 
reintroducing legislation to restrict judicial discretion, this analysis shows the impact of the 
reduction in discretion resulting from the Feeney Amendment.  
 3
Probit analysis shows a strong negative impact of the Feeney Amendment on the probability of a 
downward departure; in fact, the Feeney Amendment resulted in almost a 5% decrease in the 
likelihood of an offender receiving a downward departure. The effect of the amendment on total 
prison sentence is positive and significant. Because judges are not departing from the sentencing 
Guidelines as much during the Feeney time period, offenders are sentenced to a longer prison 
term (on average, the increase is two months). We also examine whether the Feeney Amendment 
impacts the number of adjustments justices make to the base offense level or the criminal history 
points an offender is assigned. There is no evidence judges adjust base offense levels downward 
or altered criminal history points in an effort to circumvent the intentions of the Feeney 
Amendment.  Thus, our results suggest the change in sentence length due to the Feeney 
Amendment is a result of the decrease in departures.  
 
Background on Sentencing Guidelines 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission was created by the Sentencing Reform Act provisions of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. The commission was directed to create the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines which establish uniform sentencing of defendants sentenced across the 
federal court system.  Congressional reform of the judicial system was both a response to the 
perceived liberalism in sentencing during the seventies and early eighties, as well as an effort to 
reduce disparity among sentences for the same crime (Anderson, Kling and Stith 1999, 
Weinstein 2003).1  In addition to reducing judicial discretion over sentencing, the Sentencing 
Reform Act also initiated Appellate review of sentences and abolished parole for federal 
offenders.   
 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines take into account both the seriousness of the crime and the 
defendant’s criminal record when determining sentencing length.  To establish the seriousness of 
the crime, the Sentencing Guidelines assign each type of crime (murder, robbery, antitrust 
violations, etc.) a base offense level (BOL). The more serious the crime, the higher the base 
offense level assigned (e.g., robbery has a base offense level of 20, while for trespassing the 
                                                 
1 See Stith and Cabranes (1998) for an in-depth discussion of the Sentencing Guidelines as well as the history of 
federal sentencing and sentencing reform. 
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BOL is 4).2  The Guidelines also prescribe a complex set of rules on how the final offense level 
is calculated. For example, specific offense characteristics listed in Chapter Two of the 
Guidelines either add or subtract from the base offense level; these characteristics vary across 
offenses.3  Chapter Three adjustments are then taken into account.  These are based on victim 
characteristics, the offender’s role in the offense, and whether or not obstruction of justice took 
place.  Finally, after adjustments for multiple count adjustments and acceptance of responsibility 
are made, one derives the final offense level (FOL) used to determine sentencing length.4 
 
The Guidelines account for an offender’s criminal record by assigning criminal history points 
which place the offender in one of six possible criminal history categories. The first category 
captures those criminals assigned zero or one criminal history point by the judge in post-
conviction sentencing proceedings.   Category 6 reflects those offenders assigned 13 or more 
criminal history points.  The total points assigned by the judge depend on the number of prior 
adult convictions and how long the offender was imprisoned for each prior adult offense.  For 
example, the judge will assign 3 points for each prior conviction greater than 13 months, 2 points 
for each prior conviction less than 13 months, but greater than 60 days, and 1 point for a prior 
conviction less than 60 days.  Additional points are assigned if prior convictions were crimes of 
violence.  
 
Table A1 of the appendix reproduces the Federal Sentencing Table that depicts how both the 
offense level and criminal history category determine sentencing.   On the vertical axis, the 
numerical values 1 to 43 represent the severity of the criminal offense, with 1 being the least 
severe.    If the final offense level, which is the base offense level plus all adjustments, exceeds 
43, it is treated as if it were 43 for sentencing purposes. The horizontal axis indicates the six 
different criminal history categories.  The final offense level and criminal history category 
intersection indicates the presumptive sentencing range in months; the cell expresses the lower 
and upper bound of the prison term to which the judge may sentence the defendant.  Note the 
                                                 
2 §2B3.1(a) and §2B2.3, respectively. 
3 As an example, if there were a carjacking involved in committing a robbery, two levels are added to the base 
offense level and the total offense level is 22.  If there were a permanent or life-threatening bodily injury, the judge 
adds an additional 6 levels, for a total offense level of 28.   
4 See the 2004 Federal Sentencing Guidelines for details on how to calculate the final offense level for robbery and 
other types of crime.   The U.S. Sentencing Commission posts sample worksheets on their website that detail how to 
calculate final offense levels:  http://www.ussc.gov/training/sent_ex_rob.pdf. 
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sentencing range is relatively small; the upper bound is only 25% more than the lower bound. A 
judge can impose a sentence of any length within the range so long as the sentence is not outside 
statutory limits.5 In addition, the 258 cells of the Sentencing Table have been divided into four 
zones that reflect the extent to which alternatives to prison sentencing may be used (e.g., home 
confinement, community service).   For example, “if the applicable guideline range is in Zone A 
of the Sentencing Table, a sentence of imprisonment is not required, unless the applicable 
guideline in Chapter Two expressly requires such a term” (2004 Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual).  
 
In addition to discretion on where the sentence falls within the sentencing range, judges may 
“depart” from the Guidelines if there is an “aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or 
to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 
formulating the Guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.”6 If the 
judge departs (upwards or downwards) from the range specified in Guidelines, the judge must 
state in writing the reasons for the departure. Departures are subject to appeal.  Schanzenbach 
(2005b) discusses departures in detail but there some important elements of departures that 
should be noted. First, departures may be granted when the defendant has provided substantial 
assistance to the government in the prosecution of others, with the agreement of the prosecutor. 
These “substantial assistance departures” are the most common reason for a sentence outside the 
range of the Sentencing Guidelines. Second, the judge may depart if it can be shown that the 
circumstances of the case or offender are unusual and lay outside the “heartland” (ordinary 
crimes) of the Guidelines; however the Guidelines prohibit departures due to race, sex, 
citizenship or religion.7 In addition to a departure, some offenders receive sentences outside the 
Sentencing Guidelines if the “safety valve” is applied. The “safety valve” removes the statutory 
minimum sentence for some drug crimes if the court finds the defendant has minimal criminal 
history, the crime did not result in death or serious injury, and the defendant provided the 
government with truthful, complete information.8 
 
                                                 
5Generally, the statutory sentence is binding if an offense has a statutory minimum or maximum outside the 
Guidelines, except in certain cases that are eligible for the “safety valve” provision discussed below.  
6 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). 
7 U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10. 
8 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). 
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Background on the Feeney Amendment 
In 2003, Congress passed the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of 
Children Today Act (the PROTECT Act) in an effort to increase the severity of punishment for 
child victim crimes and establish a national notification system for child kidnappings. The 
PROTECT Act included an amendment by Congressman Tom Feeney (R-FL), who argued that 
the number of downward departures were becoming more common and the federal judiciary 
were more lenient than Guidelines required.9 This amendment, which became known as the 
Feeney Amendment, called for several sentencing reforms which significantly reduced the ability 
of a district judge to sentence an offender outside of the Guidelines range.  
 
The Feeney Amendment requires judges to give more detailed reasons for downward departures, 
limits the grounds for departing in remanded cases, and expands the grounds and tightens the 
standards of appellate review (Berman, 2003). The district’s chief judge must submit a written 
explanation to the USSC within thirty days, which the Commission forwards to the Department 
of Justice and congressional judiciary committees. The Feeney Amendment also mandated de 
novo review of judicial departures by the appellate court, thereby expanding the grounds for 
appellate review of departures.10  If the appellate court remands a case (sends it back to the 
district court for action), the district court could only depart from the Guidelines if the reason for 
departure was written in the original statement of reasons for the original sentence and was found 
to be a reasonable basis for departure by the appellate court. The amendment also required the 
Sentencing Commission to amend the Guidelines so that departures were substantially reduced, 
and limited the judicial representation on the Sentencing Commission to three (out of seven) 
members.  
 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 gave prosecutors relatively more power in the plea-
bargaining process (Weinstein 2003) and the Feeney Amendment extended this prosecutorial 
power; one doctrine of the amendment required a government motion for defendants to receive 
                                                 
9 Note, hereafter we will refer to the Feeney Amendment as the policy of interest although it is part of the larger 
PROTECT Act.  
10 Prior to the Feeney Amendment, appellate courts could reverse a departure based on the legal conclusion that the 
Guidelines already accounted for the type of circumstances the district judge considered in sentencing the defendant 
(i.e., the appellate court could find the case did indeed fall within the ‘heartland’ of the Guidelines).  By mandating 
de novo review of departure cases, the Feeney Amendment called for appellate courts to review all elements of the 
case. 
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the full three-point downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility (Etienne 2003). 
Although the objective of the amendment was to reduce the number of judicial departures, 
Congress also included the possibility of “fast track” programs upon motion of the prosecutor; 
programs allowing for downward departures up to four levels in exchange for early disposition 
of the case.11 Fast track program are only available in certain districts and require approval by 
the Attorney General and the local U.S. Attorney.  In response to the Feeney Amendment, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft ordered federal prosecutors to only agree to downward 
departures in “rare” circumstances, to prosecute the “most serious, readily provable offense,” and 
to actively oppose downward departures in sentencing.12   
 
In January of 2005, after two years of opposition by many judges, the Supreme Court ruled in 
United States v. Booker that the Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment (the right 
to a jury trial). Under the Guidelines, lower court judges could sentence defendants based on 
additional findings that had not been proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather than 
eliminate the Sentencing Guidelines, the Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines 
should be considered advisory rather than mandatory. The advisory nature of the Guidelines, 
however, could lead the U.S. Congress to pass more constitutional versions of the Feeney 
Amendment or install mandatory minimum sentences.  
 
Table A2 in the appendix shows the number of departures received by offenders for the years 
1999-2005, by categories of offense type.13 Notice that the columns for 2003 and 2004 are 
shaded, as these are the years where the Feeney Amendment was in effect. For almost every 
crime category, the percentages of departures decrease during those years, most noticeably in 
2004. For example, violent crime offenders receive downward departures in roughly 28% of the 
cases prior to 2003, but only 21% of the violent crime offenders are granted downward 
departures in 2004. The two categories that do not exhibit this pattern of decreasing departure 
                                                 
11 The fast track program, designed to allow for early disposition of a case in congested districts, requires the 
defendant to waive rights to appeal, pretrial motions, and collateral relief.  
12 Ashcroft, John.. Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and 
Sentencing. Internal memo to all Federal Prosecutors. #516. September 22, 2003. U.S. Department of Justice. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm 
13 We group the offenses into categories similar to Schanzenbach and Tiller (2006). For example, violent crimes 
include murder, sexual abuse, assault and arson. White collar crimes include antitrust, fraud, bribery, and tax crimes. 
Racketeering also includes gambling offenses. 
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rates are environmental crimes and civil rights crimes; however the number of these offense 
types is relatively minor. Another noteworthy trend in the data is the change in percentage of 
departures in 2005, after the Sentencing Guidelines are ruled advisory in U.S. v. Booker. In every 
crime category, the percentage of downward departures increases, suggesting that judges begin 
to depart from the Guidelines immediately once the Guidelines are no longer mandatory. 
 
Previous Research 
Because one of the objectives of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was to reduce sentencing 
disparity, several studies have scrutinized whether sentencing disparity diminished after 
implementation of the Guidelines. Hofer, Blackwell, and Ruback (1999) conclude that 
sentencing disparity has decreased after implementation of the Guidelines. The authors note, 
however, that improvement in sentencing disparity varies regionally and across cases. Anderson, 
Kling and Stith (1999) examine inter-judge disparity in the average length of prison sentence 
before and after implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines. One of the unique features of this 
paper is that it utilizes data from a special extract from the U.S. Federal Courts that includes 
information that allows one to link together cases heard by the same judge (but does not provide 
data on the characteristics of the judge). Anderson et. al. (1999) show that inter-judge disparity in 
nominal sentencing is less pronounced in the Guidelines era (1988 – 1993) than it was in the era 
of discretionary sentencing. Before the Guidelines, the expected difference in sentence length 
across judges was 16-18 percent and after the Guidelines the expected difference ranges between 
8-13 percent. 
 
In addition to examining whether sentencing disparity was reduced after the Guidelines, 
considerable literature exists regarding the degree to which individual offender characteristics 
(race, gender, ethnicity, etc.) may explain observed sentencing disparities.14  Mustard (2001) 
extends this literature by examining sentencing disparity among all 41 offenses defined by the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission, and then disaggregating by the six most frequently committed 
crimes (drug trafficking, fraud, larceny, firearm possession and trafficking, immigration, and 
bank robbery). He finds that after controlling for offense level, criminal history, and offense 
                                                 
14 Examples include (but are not limited to) Lacasse and Payne (1999), Payne (1997), and Bushway and Piehl 
(2001). 
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type, large differences still exist in prison sentence across individuals by race, gender, education 
level, income, and citizenship status. Additionally, Mustard shows that some groups (Blacks, 
males, less educated, lower income earners, non U.S. citizens) are less likely to receive a 
downward departure and less likely to receive no prison term.  
 
The literature also addresses the extent to which the demographic composition of the district 
court in which an offender was sentenced explains sentencing disparity. Schanzenbach (2005a) 
studies the impact of judicial race, gender and political affiliation (political party of nominating 
president) on inter-judge sentencing disparity on the basis of offender characteristics displayed in 
Mustard (2001). While some significant effects of interaction terms were observed (more 
females judges reduce disparity in sentencing of female offenders), overall, Schanzenbach 
(2005a) shows that the proportions of the district judges that are black, female, or appointed by a 
Democrat do not have significant effects on sentencing for minority offenders. In addition, the 
proportion of Democrat-appointed judges had no effect on disparity. 
 
Although judicial demographics do not have a clear, definitive impact on sentencing disparity, 
the political composition of the bench may impact the discretionary tools utilized by a judge. 
Schanzenbach and Tiller (2006) look at whether judicial discretion is related to judge’s policy 
preferences. Specifically, they focus on whether the political alignment of the circuit and district 
court (both appointed by the same party) may have an impact on the behavior of the sentencing 
judge.  Judges are strategic policy makers that have two instruments of discretion (1) fact-
oriented aggravating and mitigating factors that judges use to make changes to the base offense 
level and (2) upward or downward departures from the Guidelines Sentencing range. District 
judges anticipate the actions of the circuit court justices and try to maximize their preferences, 
considering the likelihood for review of the decision and its impact on their career advancement. 
The authors focus on street crimes (largest part of case sample) and data from 1992-2003. The 
results show there exist partisan differences in the sentencing of street crimes (roughly 10% 
difference between Democrat-appointed and Republican-appointed benches). Alignment of a 
democrat district judge with circuit court results in a reduction of 9.5 months versus 5.5 months 
if not aligned.  
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Recently studies have looked at the new policies of the Feeney Amendment and the effect of 
U.S. v. Booker making the Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory. Schanzenbach 
(2005b) analyzes the arguments Representative Feeney made in favor of his amendment to the 
PROTECT Act using 1993-2001 data on defendants sentenced under Guidelines and political 
composition of districts from the Federal Judicial Center biographical data. The analysis tries to 
find measurable, significant changes over time that match up with Feeney’s argument that judges 
were becoming more lenient. The general finding is that downward departures increased, but the 
increase is attenuated when controls for the nature of the offense and district in which case was 
prosecuted are included. Offender demographics do not alter the trends in downward departures, 
which is encouraging since judges are not permitted to consider demographic information in 
making departures. Although the rate of departures increased prior to the Feeney Amendment, 
the increase was not as large as supporters of the amendment argued. When Schanzenbach 
includes the proportion of Democrat-appointed district judges, the coefficient is positive but 
never significant. So the increasing number of Democrat-appointed judges pre-Feeney is not a 
factor in explaining the increase in downward departure rates. Another important finding is that 
when one controls for offense and demographics, prison sentence length does not change much 
over the time period. Including the proportion of Democrat-appointed judges does not affect the 
length of prison sentence.15   
 
The legal and political science literature on the impact of U.S. v. Booker is growing as well. 
Using fact pattern matching to control for differences in case facts for drug trafficking cases 
Tiede (2008) analyzes the impact of both the PROTECT Act and the U.S. v. Booker decision on 
a small subsample of cases (less than 2000 observations). She finds that policies limiting judicial 
discretion lead to longer sentences than when judges are not constrained. Our paper improves 
upon this work by utilizing the full dataset (over 100,000 observations on cases) and 
incorporating fixed effects regression analysis to control for the individual case characteristics. 
Hofer (2007) analyzes disparity among judges given the US v. Booker decision of 2005. In U.S. 
v. Booker, the Supreme Court holds that Sentencing Guidelines are advisory rather than 
mandatory. The Booker decision may free up judges to use their discretion more, however they 
                                                 
15 In all of the following analysis, we perform alternative specifications which include the percentage of the district 
bench appointed by a Democrat president as a covariate. The results are not qualitatively or quantitatively different. 
These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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must still consider the guideline range as advisory. Looking at 2001-2006 data, Hofer argues that 
during the Booker quarter, non-government sponsored below-range sentences jump from ~4% to 
~12% and within-range sentences decrease.  Hofer shows that there appears to be increasing 
trend toward severity and after the Feeney Amendment and PROTECT Act there is an increase 
in sentence length. Hofer argues that the changes in sentencing lengths between 2001 and 2006 
may be due to different types of offenses being prosecuted and sentenced. 
 
This paper is most similar to Tiede (2008), Hofer (2007) and Schanzenbach (2005b) in that we 
analyze the impact of a policy change (the Feeney Amendment) on judicial sentencing behavior, 
specifically the likelihood of downward departures and total prison term length. Schanzenbach 
(2005b) uses similar regression analysis to study whether an increase in judicial leniency existed 
in the period before the PROTECT Act. Tiede (2008) studies the impact of the Feeney 
Amendment and U.S. v. Booker and shows an increase in sentence length; however, she limits 
the data to fewer than 2000 observations of drug cases. To our knowledge, there are no other 
studies that use the complete set of federal offenders to specifically test the effect of the Feeney 
Amendment on the probability of a downward departure and the prison term length.  In addition, 
we examine whether judges tried to circumvent Feeney through adjustments to offense levels 
and/or criminal history points in order to lower prison terms. 
 
Data  
The data we use are from the “Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences” series collected by the 
United States Sentencing Commission (USSC).16  The USSC data include records for every 
offender sentenced under the Sentencing Guidelines and report key characteristics of the 
sentencing such as the primary offense, the offense level calculated by the court, the length of the 
prison sentence, and whether a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines was granted. The 
offender’s criminal history is also reported, as well as the offender’s demographic characteristics. 
 
                                                 
16 The data are publicly-available through the Federal Justice Statistics Center maintained by the Urban Institute at 
http://fjsrc.urban.org/download/getinfor.cfm. Alternatively, researchers with access to the Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) may download the USSC data at 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/SERIES/00083.xml 
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We use sentencing years 1999-2004 and January of 2005 (the U.S. v. Booker decision), which 
gives us data from four years prior to the enactment of the PROTECT Act (with the Feeney 
Amendment) and the entire time period Feeney was valid. There are 355,454 valid cases that fall 
within this time period.17 We exclude cases with more than one count of conviction or more than 
one sentencing guideline computation, which yields 282,588 observations. Following 
Schanzenbach and Tiller (2006), we eliminate immigration, traffic, national-defense, other, and 
miscellaneous offenses, leaving a sample size of 214,165. We also exclude cases with sentences 
of “life in prison” or “death” which results in a sample of 213,019 cases.  Finally, the sample size 
is reduced due to missing data on demographic and offense characteristics or key information to 
determine sentencing and likelihood of departures.  
 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the dependent variables and control variables of 
interest. In all model specifications, we include demographic characteristics of the offender, 
characteristics of the offense, and dummy variables for sentencing year.18 The first panel of 
Table 1 describes the sentencing characteristics; departures occur in 35% of the cases in our 
sample and 12.6% of those are downward departures that are not government sponsored. The 
majority of the sample occurs prior to the Feeney Amendment, with 25% of cases being 
sentenced post-Feeney. The average prison sentence is 54 months and 97% of all cases are 
sentenced through plea agreements. The second panel of Table 1 presents the demographic 
variables, which include age, age-squared, dummies for Black, Hispanic, Asian, American 
Indian and other race, a dummy for female, a dummy for whether or not the defendant is a U.S. 
citizen, dummies for whether the defendant has one, two, or more than two dependents, and 
                                                 
17 There are a total of 451,310 cases from 1999-2004, however, based on recommendations from our contact at the 
USSC, we delete all observations where the USSC provided variable “Sources” does not equal 1.  For these 
observations, the Commission did not receive enough information about the case to determine the final court 
findings, or some of the information reported for the case is taken from multiple documents because the information 
was inconsistent. 
18 Previous research has shown demographic variables have significant effects on sentencing (Glaser and Sacerdote 
2003), even after controlling for characteristics of the crime (Mustard 2001; Schanzenbach 2005; Bjerk 2005).   The 
Sentencing Guidelines generally prohibit the consideration of race or citizenship status in determining sentencing in 
an attempt to promote uniformity in sentencing in the federal court system.  Part H of the Guidelines, however, 
allows the judge to consider age, number of dependents and educational attainment in departing from the guidelines 
or determining where to place the sentence within the guidelines range.  The Commission’s policy is that these 
factors are “not ordinarily relevant” (Campbell and Bemporad 2004).     
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dummies for educational attainment.19 A dummy for whether the offender was defended by 
private legal counsel is also included as a demographic variable to act as a proxy for offender 
income.20  
 
Estimation and Results 
Using the sentencing data described above, we can look at the empirical effects of the Feeney 
Amendment. Specifically, we will analyze (1) whether the probability of downward departures 
decreased after Feeney; (2) whether the total prison sentence increased after the Feeney 
Amendment was passed; (3) the impact of Feeney on the offense level adjustments that judges 
make prior to sentencing; and (4) whether the passage of Feeney impacted the adjustment to 
criminal history points that judges perform prior to sentencing.  
 
Downward Departure 
We first examine the relationship between the Feeney Amendment and downward departures. 
Recall that one of the main arguments for the Feeney Amendment was that the rate of downward 
departures was high and judicial departures led to unwarranted leniency and sentencing disparity. 
The provisions of the Feeney Amendment and the resulting actions of Attorney General Ashcroft 
lead us to expect a decrease in the probability of an offender receiving a downward departure 
post Feeney. We estimate probit models of the form: 
 
        
where i indexes the offender, j indexes the district of sentencing, and t indexes the year of 
sentencing. Downward Departure is equal to 1 if the judge departs from the guidelines and 
sentences the offender to a shorter sentence than the minimum guideline, and zero otherwise.  
                                                 
19 The categories for educational attainment include less than high school, completion of high school or GED, trade 
school, some college, associate’s degree, college degree, military school and graduate or professional school. 
20 Mustard (2001) shows that offender income has a significant impact on the probability of receiving a prison 
sentence. Unfortunately, the USSC no longer reports offender income after 2002.   Instead we use private defense 
counsel as a proxy for income.   The USSC also stops reporting counsel information in 2003, but the information is 
available in the Administrative Office of U.S. District Court (AOUSC) dataset called "Defendants in Federal 
criminal cases terminated in U.S. District Court.”   We use the Bureau of Justice’s “Linking Data File” to link the 
datasets to obtain more complete defense counsel information.   When we rerun the regressions without the private 
defense counsel dummy, the results do not change qualitatively or quantitatively. 
 14
The coefficient of interest is β, the effect of the implementation of the Feeney Amendment on 
prison sentences. In all model specifications, we include demographic characteristics of the 
offender, and fixed effects for district and year of sentencing (SentYear).  The offense 
characteristics include dummies for the 35 offense categories such as murder, drug trafficking, 
larceny, etc. Table A3 in the Appendix lists the frequency of the USSC offenses in our main 
sample data. In addition, a dummy for whether the case was settled by a trial (rather than a plea 
agreement), and the guideline minimum sentence were included as offense characteristics.21 
Following Schanzenbach and Tiller (2005b), we report robust standard errors that are clustered 
by district.  
 
We estimate three model specifications for the probability of departure. Model 1 does not control 
for criminal history category and offense level, however, the second and third models include 
dummies for position on the sentencing grid.  Position can be determined in one of two ways: a 
dummy for the cell on the sentencing table conditional on the base offense level and criminal 
history category (Model 2), or a dummy for the cell conditional on the final offense level and 
criminal history category (Model 3).22 Table 2 reports the marginal effects and significance of 
the probit coefficients on the likelihood of receiving a downward departure.  Note the sample 
sizes are smaller than that of Table 1 because we exclude all cases that have a downward 
departure due to substantial assistance, cases that were fast-tracked, or cases where the safety 
valve was applied. We also eliminate all cases that fall into ‘Zone A’ because probation, non-
prison terms and alternate confinement are available sentencing options for cases in this zone.23 
As expected, the coefficients for the Feeney Amendment are consistently negative and 
significant for all models. Specifically, setting all other variables equal to their means, the 
implementation of Feeney resulted in roughly a 5% decrease in the probability of receiving a 
downward departure.  
 
 
                                                 
21 The guideline minimum sentence is the bottom of the final guideline range, taking statutory trumps into account. 
22 Mustard (2001) uses a similar strategy to control for position on the sentencing table. Schanzenbach and Tiller 
(2006) control for the position on the sentencing grid by including dummies for base (or final) offense level, 
dummies for criminal history category, and interaction terms for offense level and criminal history category. When 
we include this larger set of controls for offense characteristics, the results do not change. 
23 Since zero months of prison is a sentencing option for Zone A cases, it would be difficult to identify the impact of 
Feeney on the probability of a departure from the Guidelines.  
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Total Prison Sentence 
We next consider the potential impact of the Feeney Amendment on total prison sentence length. 
Schanzenbach (2005b) showed that prison sentence lengths were relatively stable in the years 
1993-2001, controlling for offense and offender characteristics. Because Feeney restricted 
judicial discretion and departures were less likely, we expect the length of prison sentences to be 
longer post-Feeney than when departures were more likely.  We estimate the following equation 
for prison sentencing: 
 
 
Prison term is the total prison sentence in months offender i receives when sentenced in district j 
in sentencing year t. The control variables are defined as described above in the downward 
departure analysis. As before, we exclude all cases that fall into “Zone A” because zero months 
is a possibility according to the sentencing guidelines (this represents about 10% of all cases), 
but do not (initially) exclude departures due to substantial assistance, fast-track cases, or safety 
valve cases.   
  
Table 3 presents coefficient estimates for alternative specifications for estimating the prison 
sentencing model. Model 1 controls for individual offender characteristics and offense 
characteristics with sentencing year and district fixed effects, 24 Model 2 includes controls for the 
position on the sentencing table with the base offense level and Model 3 uses the final offense 
level to control for sentencing position. The coefficient estimate on the Feeney dummy (Feeney 
in effect) is positive and significant in all models, implying that the effect of Feeney was to 
increase the total length of prison sentence by about 1.9 months, even after controlling for 
characteristics of the individual and characteristics of the crime. The coefficients on 
demographics are consistent with Mustard (2001) and Schanzenbach (2005a). For example, 
Black and Hispanic offenders receive longer sentences, women receive shorter sentences, and 
older offenders receive longer sentences. Because departures due to substantial assistance are 
driven by the prosecution and thus represent prosecutorial discretion rather than judicial 
discretion, we exclude cases where the offender was granted a downward departure due to 
                                                 
24 Several studies have shown there is variation in sentencing across districts and so it is common in the literature to 
control for district fixed effects (Mustard 2001, Schanzenbach 2005, Schanzenbach and Tiller 2006).  
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substantial assistance in Models 2b and 3b. Cases that were fast tracked or cases where the safety 
valve was applied were also excluded because these departures are granted by law. The number 
of observations is reduced; however the coefficient on Feeney remains positive and significant.  
 
Model 4 presents the estimates when we exclude all cases where the judge departed from the 
sentencing guidelines. Note that the magnitude of coefficient estimate on Feeney is greatly 
reduced and is no longer significantly different from zero, even at the 10% level. This implies 
that the increase in sentencing length due to Feeney is exhibited disproportionately in the 
departures cases. 
 
Judicial Sentencing Tools 
The sentencing range is determined by both the offense level (which may be adjusted up or down 
given the facts of the case) and criminal history category. Although the Feeney Amendment 
reduced the likelihood of a judicial departure from the guidelines, it may be possible that judges 
shifted judicial discretion into adjustments of the offense level or adjustments to criminal history 
points (which determine criminal history category).   
 
To study the potential effect of the Feeney Amendment on changes to the offense level, we 
calculate the difference between final prison sentence received and the Guideline minimum 
sentence conditional on the criminal history category and the base offense level (before the judge 
makes any adjustments to the offense level). We regress this difference in months of sentencing 
on the same set of control variables and present the results in Table 4. The first column presents 
the results with all offenders. The coefficient on Feeney is positive and significant, implying that 
the Feeney Amendment led to positive adjustments (increases) to the base offense level that 
resulted in longer sentences. Next, we exclude all offenders who did not receive a substantial 
assistance departure, have their case fast tracked, or have the safety valve applied. The 
coefficient remains positive and significant. If the Feeney amendment restricted judicial leniency 
and judges were using adjustment as an instrument for leniency, we would expect negative 
adjustments (decreases) to the base offense level. In the final column, we exclude all cases where 
a departure was granted. The coefficient on Feeney is still positive but not significant. We 
interpret these results as providing evidence that the difference in sentence length from the 
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Guideline minimum for the base offense level due to the Feeney Amendment is a result of the 
decrease in departures. There is no evidence that judges adjusted base offense levels downward 
in an effort to circumvent the intentions of the Feeney Amendment. 
 
We next study the change in criminal history points assigned to the offender. The criminal 
history category is determined by criminal history points, which are assigned on the basis of the 
offender’s past record and judicial determination in those previous offenses. The USSC data 
include the subtotal of criminal history points and the total number of criminal history points 
applied. We regress the change in criminal history points on the same set of control variables as 
above. We also use the same three specifications: a) all offenders, b) offenders who did not 
receive a substantial assistance departure, fast-track or safety valve, and c) all non-departure 
cases. The results are displayed in Table 5. The Feeney Amendment is not significant in any of 
the specifications.   Thus, there is no evidence that judges tried to circumvent Feeney by using 
legal judicial discretion to lower prison sentences. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper uses USSC data on federal offender between 1999 and 2004 to examine the effect of 
the Feeney Amendment on the rate of downward departures and total prison sentence. We 
control for offense type, criminal history and demographic characteristics of the offender, in 
order to isolate the changes in judicial sentencing due to the Feeney Amendment. The probit 
analysis shows a strong negative impact of the Feeney Amendment on the probability of a 
downward departure. The effect of the amendment on total prison sentence is positive and 
significant; conditional on offender demographics and crime characteristics, offenders are 
sentenced to a prison term that is two months longer while the Feeney Amendment is in effect. 
We also examine the number of adjustments justices make to the base offense level and the 
criminal history points assigned to an offender. Our results suggest that the impact of the Feeney 
Amendment is largely exhibited by a decrease in the rate of downward departures. We find no 
evidence judges adjust base offense levels downward or altered criminal history points in an 
effort to circumvent the intentions of the Feeney Amendment. 
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Our next step is to identify the effect of the Feeney Amendment on the sentencing dispersion. 
Given that the Feeney Amendment led to a decrease in departures from the Guidelines, we intend 
to study the location of the prison sentence within the Guidelines as a result of Feeney. For 
example, rather than departing from the Guidelines, do we observe judges sentencing at the 
minimum of the Guideline range post Feeney? Recognizing that one of the stated purposes of the 
Feeney Amendment was to reduce perceived disparity and leniency, we also will examine the 
impact of the Feeney Amendment on the racial, ethnic and gender disparities in sentencing 
length documented in previous literature. 
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Appendix 
Table A1:  U.S.S.C. Federal Sentencing Table 
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 Table A2: Number and Percentage of Departures by Year and Offense Type 
 
 Year 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Violent 389 383 363 367 357 218 341
 29% 29% 28% 28% 26% 21% 32%
Drugs 7958 7792 8459 8486 7385 4831 6451
 46% 44% 46% 45% 39% 37% 49%
Theft 499 664 783 944 1044 753 1213
 24% 23% 25% 25% 21% 19% 29%
White Collar 2140 2299 2173 2209 1938 1336 1912
 26% 28% 27% 27% 24% 23% 35%
Racketeering 207 161 140 162 139 104 126
 41% 37% 42% 38% 35% 38% 44%
Civil Rights 10 15 14 13 11 15 7
 23% 31% 22% 33% 28% 43% 37%
Pornography 101 120 96 134 127 72 209
 37% 34% 28% 31% 23% 17% 33%
Obstruction 175 183 229 209 188 131 192
 29% 26% 30% 30% 28% 25% 39%
Environmental 34 43 24 20 23 11 15
 39% 38% 38% 47% 58% 29% 42%
11513 11660 12281 12544 11212 7471 10466Total # of 
Departures 38% 37% 38% 37% 32% 30% 41%
 Note: The Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT ACT became effective on April 30, 2003 
and subsequently was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in January of 2005. 
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Table A3: Frequency of USSC Offenses in Full Sample 
 
USSC 
Code Offense Freq. Percent
1 Murder 218 0.14
2 Manslaughter 240 0.15
3 Kidnapping/Hostage 108 0.07
4 Sexual Abuse 879 0.56
5 Assault 1,348 0.86
6 Bank Robbery, includes other Robbery 4,121 2.63
9 Arson 194 0.12
10 Drugs: Trafficking 95,137 60.78
11 Drugs: Communication Facilities 1,438 0.92
12 Drugs: Simple Possession 380 0.24
13 Firearms: Use (includes Firearms possession) 18,046 11.53
15 Burglary/Breaking and Entering 185 0.12
16 Auto Theft 352 0.22
17 Larceny 3,232 2.06
18 Fraud 12,905 8.25
19 Embezzlement 1,492 0.95
20 Forgery/Counterfeiting 2,982 1.91
21 Bribery 270 0.17
22 Tax Offenses 802 0.51
23 Money Laundering 2,072 1.32
24 Racketeering (includes Extortion) 1,655 1.06
25 Gambling/Lottery 120 0.08
26 Civil Rights Offenses 159 0.1
27 Immigration 1,289 0.82
28 Pornography/Prostitution 2,123 1.36
29 Offenses in Prison 1,292 0.83
30 Administration of Justice - Related; including accessory after 
the fact, misprision of felony, witness tampering 
2,252 1.44
31 Environmental, Game, Fish, and Wildlife Offenses 96 0.06
32 National Defense Offenses 13 0.01
33 Antitrust Violations 34 0.02
34 Food and Drug Offenses 52 0.03
35 Traffic Violations and Other Offenses 1,033 0.66
. Missing 1 
  ----------  
 Total 156,920  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Variable 
 
Mean 
 
Standard
Error
Offense/Sentencing  Characteristics  
 Prison Sentence 54.06 55.42
 Departed from Guidelines 0.350 0.477
 Downward Departure 0.126 0.332
 Upward Departure 0.006 0.078
 Post-Feeney Dummy 0.245 0.430
 No Plea Agreement 0.024 0.154
 Guideline Minimum 64.24 63.40
 Criminal History Category 2.384 1.716
 Base Offense Level 22.07 9.406
  
Demographic Characteristics  
 Age  33.47 10.30
 U.S. Citizen 0.758 0.428
 No dependents 0.371 0.483
 One dependent 0.187 0.390
 Two dependents 0.171 0.376
 Three or more dependents 0.272 0.445
 Less than High School 0.455 0.498
 High School Graduate 0.325 0.468
 Trade School Graduate 0.012 0.108
 Some College 0.149 0.356
 College Graduate 0.037 0.189
 Associates Degree 0.012 0.109
 Professional/Graduate School 0.009 0.095
 Military School 0.000 0.014
 Hispanic 0.340 0.474
 White 0.642 0.479
 Black 0.319 0.466
 American Indian or Alaskan Native 0.019 0.137
 Asian 0.017 0.130
 Other Race 0.003 0.050
 Male 0.869 0.338
 Female 0.131 0.338
 Private Counsel 0.192 0.394
    
 Number of Observations 156,520  
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Table 2: Marginal Effects, Probability of Downward Departure 
 
 
Model 1 
(No GRID) 
Model 2 
(GRID Using  
Base Offense) 
Model 3 
(GRID Using  
Final Offense) 
  Robust  Robust  Robust 
 dF/dx Std. Err dF/dx Std. Err dF/dx Std. Err 
Post-Feeney Dummy -0.046 0.006 -0.045 0.006 -0.046 0.006
Not Plea Agreement -0.029 0.006 -0.022 0.006 -0.021 0.007
Guideline Minimum Sentence 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
  
Age  -0.006 0.001 -0.006 0.001 -0.007 0.001
Age Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
U.S. Citizen -0.006 0.007 -0.007 0.006 -0.006 0.006
One dependent 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.003
Two dependents 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.003
Three or more dependents 0.012 0.003 0.011 0.003 0.012 0.003
High School Graduate -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002
Trade School Graduate 0.006 0.012 0.006 0.011 0.008 0.011
Some College 0.013 0.004 0.013 0.004 0.015 0.004
College Graduate 0.035 0.007 0.032 0.006 0.033 0.006
Associates Degree -0.002 0.009 -0.001 0.009 -0.002 0.009
Professional/Graduate School 0.052 0.011 0.046 0.011 0.047 0.012
Military School 0.074 0.081 0.087 0.086 0.076 0.078
Hispanic -0.016 0.005 -0.015 0.005 -0.013 0.005
Black -0.027 0.004 -0.028 0.004 -0.029 0.004
American Indian/Alaskan Native -0.025 0.014 -0.023 0.013 -0.022 0.014
Asian -0.007 0.009 -0.009 0.008 -0.004 0.009
Other Race 0.014 0.022 0.016 0.023 0.014 0.022
Female 0.065 0.009 0.064 0.009 0.068 0.009
Private Counsel -0.011 0.005 -0.008 0.005 -0.008 0.005
  
  
Sentencing Table Position FE NO YES  YES
Exclude Substantial Assistance, 
Safety Valve & Fast Track Cases YES YES  YES
   
Number of Observations 98369 98264  98280  
Pseudo R2 0.2202 0.2288  0.2311  
Log pseudolikelihood -32742.34   -32364.52  -32275.31  
Note: All models include sentencing year fixed effects, district court fixed effects, and dummies 
for each type of offense. Bold indicates significance at a 10% level or higher. 
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Table 3: Total Prison Time in Months 
 
 
 
Model 1 
(No GRID) 
 
Model 2 
(Include GRID - Base) 
 
Model 3 
(Include GRID -Final) 
 
  Robust  Robust  Robust 
 Coefficient Std. Err Coefficient Std. Err Coefficient Std. Err 
Post-Feeney Dummy 1.968 0.416 1.891 0.409 1.954 0.412
Not Plea Agreement 22.103 1.500 21.823 1.441 21.543 1.520
Guideline Minimum Sentence 0.751 0.015 0.754 0.016 0.718 0.018
  
Age  0.416 0.043 0.240 0.040 0.212 0.041
Age Squared -0.005 0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 0.001
U.S. Citizen -1.372 0.456 -2.311 0.466 -2.561 0.478
One dependent -0.516 0.212 -0.455 0.199 -0.438 0.204
Two dependents -0.506 0.170 -0.264 0.163 -0.256 0.166
Three or more dependents -0.732 0.178 -0.376 0.171 -0.394 0.167
High School Graduate -0.782 0.212 -0.747 0.197 -0.718 0.191
Trade School Graduate -1.516 0.483 -1.099 0.480 -0.928 0.480
Some College -2.925 0.224 -2.393 0.216 -2.305 0.224
College Graduate -3.668 0.342 -2.737 0.329 -2.612 0.332
Associates Degree -2.236 0.539 -1.545 0.533 -1.504 0.530
Professional/Graduate School -3.940 0.487 -2.848 0.485 -2.809 0.498
Military School -9.191 3.261 -9.085 3.140 -8.017 3.008
Hispanic 2.289 0.415 2.428 0.390 2.512 0.405
Black 3.265 0.361 2.877 0.353 2.664 0.358
American Indian/Alaskan Native 3.816 1.671 3.882 1.616 4.054 1.700
Asian 0.015 0.595 0.412 0.537 0.374 0.565
Other Race 0.085 1.525 0.084 1.504 0.105 1.506
Female -5.134 0.467 -4.500 0.461 -4.320 0.447
Private Counsel -0.568 0.352 -0.036 0.307 0.080 0.307
Constant 34.096 5.041 42.706 5.051 60.099 7.977
  
Sentencing Table Position FE NO YES  YES
Exclude Substantial Assistance, 
Safety Valve and Fast Track Cases NO NO  NO
  
Number of Observations 156525 156519  156519
R-squared 0.805 0.811  0.810
Notes: 1.    Regressions are OLS. Bold indicates significance at a 10% level or higher.  
2. All models include sentencing year fixed effects, district court fixed effects, and 
dummies for each type of offense. 
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Table 3: Total Prison Time in Months (continued) 
 
 
 
Model 2b 
(Include GRID – Base, 
Data Exclusions) 
Model 3b 
(Include GRID – Final, 
Data Exclusions) 
Model 4 
(Include GRID – Base, 
Exclude  All 
Departures) 
  Robust  Robust  Robust 
 Coefficient Std. Err Coefficient Std. Err Coefficient Std. Err 
Post-Feeney Dummy 1.606 0.337 1.614 0.339 0.199 0.121
Not Plea Agreement 5.379 0.580 5.031 0.566 3.259 0.258
Guideline Minimum Sentence 0.935 0.009 0.928 0.010 0.992 0.004
  
Age  0.248 0.039 0.244 0.038 0.076 0.018
Age Squared -0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.000
U.S. Citizen -0.642 0.350 -0.742 0.361 -0.309 0.132
One dependent -0.077 0.145 -0.107 0.143 -0.060 0.085
Two dependents -0.185 0.141 -0.233 0.146 -0.166 0.093
Three or more dependents -0.185 0.156 -0.244 0.155 -0.133 0.096
High School Graduate 0.045 0.156 0.058 0.160 -0.031 0.082
Trade School Graduate 0.214 0.468 0.213 0.454 0.216 0.235
Some College -0.596 0.178 -0.580 0.181 -0.240 0.119
College Graduate -0.856 0.274 -0.906 0.288 -0.111 0.161
Associates Degree -0.225 0.400 -0.250 0.414 -0.165 0.242
Professional/Graduate School -0.644 0.367 -0.709 0.377 0.188 0.173
Military School -1.923 1.403 -1.277 1.456 -0.228 0.882
Hispanic 0.286 0.271 0.327 0.278 0.118 0.095
Black 1.011 0.160 1.011 0.158 0.436 0.095
American Indian/Alaskan Native 1.179 1.043 1.274 1.064 0.429 0.402
Asian 0.209 0.413 0.158 0.407 0.310 0.192
Other Race 0.090 1.508 0.228 1.495 0.505 1.257
Female -2.328 0.299 -2.237 0.295 -0.660 0.102
Private Counsel 0.254 0.195 0.242 0.199 0.043 0.078
Constant 24.399 4.943 9.853 14.438 8.662 2.170
  
Sentencing Table Position FE YES YES  YES
Exclude Substantial Assistance, 
Safety Valve and Fast Track Cases YES YES  YES
  
Number of Observations 98041 98041  101811
R-squared 0.931 0.931  0.974
       
Notes: Regressions are OLS.  Bold indicates significance at a 10% level or higher.  
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Table 4: Difference in Sentence Received and Guideline Minimum Sentence 
 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Change in Sentencing 
Months from Base Offense 
All Offenders 
Change in Sentencing 
Months from Base Offense
 Exclude Special Cases  
Change in Sentencing 
Months from Base Offense 
Exclude All Departures 
      
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
   
Feeney     
Amendment 1.788 3.38 1.493 3.18 0.415 1.09 
       
Number of 
Observations 150,834  93,311  78,242  
       
R-Squared  0.5386 0.5096 0.5891 
Notes: 
1. The change in sentencing is the difference in the final sentence given and the minimum 
sentence the offender could have been received using the assigned criminal history points and the 
base offence level (as opposed to the final offense level). 
2. Special cases excluded include departures due to substantial assistance, cases that were fast-
tracked, and cases where the safety valve was applied. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Adjustment to Criminal History Points 
 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Change in Criminal 
History Points  
All Offenders 
Change in Criminal History 
Points  
Exclude Special Cases  
Change in Criminal History 
Points  
Exclude All Departures 
      
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
   
Feeney 
Amendment 0.008 0.75 0.022 1.27 0.016 1.14 
       
Number of 
Observations 155,892  97,646  101,151  
       
R-Squared  0.5231  0.4799  0.5213  
Note:  
1. The change in criminal history points is the difference in history points based on number of 
prior adult convictions and their duration and history points after the judge makes adjusts for the 
violent nature of past crimes for instance. 
2. Special cases excluded include departures due to substantial assistance, cases that were fast-
tracked, and cases where the safety valve was applied. 
